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THE FREE EXERCISE THEREOF
STEPHEN L. CARTER!

This Essay is about the freedom of religion, which raises the
possibility that it is also about the existence of God. Ever since
the Supreme Court's first classroom prayer decisions, back in
the early 1960s, constitutional scholars and judges alike have
premised their analysis of religious freedom questions on assumptions about the existence of God that may fairly be described as skeptical-including, most emphatically, the stance
that is usually, but inaccurately, referred to as "neutral." For
example, in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Ass'n,' when the Court allowed the Forest Service to open to
logging and roadbuilding lands that three Indian tribes held sacred, the Justices explained, with evident sincerity, that this
result was neutral toward the religion of the tribes. But the effect of the logging, as even the Court conceded, was to devastate
the tribes' religious traditions, which would hardly seem neutral
from the point of view of the Native American believer. A mem* William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Yale University. This paper is a
revised version of the Cutler Lecture, delivered on April 12, 1996, at the College of
William & Mary School of Law. I am also grateful for comments that I received
when I presented earlier versions at a faculty workshop at the Yale Law School and
at the Law and Religion Section of American Law Schools.
1. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
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ber of one of the tribes surely would find the Lyng decision a
horrific interference with religious freedom; and the fact on
which the Court relied, that the destruction of the tribes' religion
was accidental rather than intentional, would be scant comfort.
Beginning in the mid-1980s, a Court majority led by Justice
Antonin Scalia has followed the same "neutrality" principle in
over half a dozen cases, ruling for the state on subjects ranging
from forbidding the wearing of a yarmulke while in military uniform2 to being forced, in contravention of religious principles, to
obtain a Social Security number for a child.' The lower federal
courts and, lately, the state courts have been caught up in the
same trend, ruling for the state in one case after the other,4
with the unsettling result that only religions possessing sufficient political clout to protect themselves are able to operate
relatively free from state interference. So pronounced has the
trend become that some scholars have pessimistically declared
the death of free exercise of religion.5 More cautious critics have
2. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
3. See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
4. See, e.g., Thiry v. Carlson, 887 F. Supp. 1407, 1414 (D. Kan.), stay granted,891 F.
Supp. 563 (D. Kan. 1995), affd, 78 F.3d 1491 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 78
(1996) (holding that condemnation for use in a highway construction project of the
gravesite of a stillborn child did not violate the parents' free exercise of religion);
Havasupai Tribe v. United States, 752 F. Supp. 1471, 1485 (D. Ariz. 1990), affd sub
noma. Havasupai Tribe v. Robertson, 943 F.2d 32 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that the Forest
Service's proposed operation of a uranium mine on national forest land did not violate
the tribe's right to free exercise of religion at the mine site, despite the tribe's claim that
the site was sacred and that any mining would interfere with the tribe's religious
practices); Yang v. Sturner, 750 F. Supp. 558, 558 (D.R.I. 1990) (holding that a Rhode
Island autopsy law did not "profoundly impair" the religious freedom of a Hmong couple
who believed that the autopsy of their son would cause his spirit to return and take
another person in the family); Manybeads v. United States, 730 F. Supp. 1515, 1517 (D.
Ariz. 1989) (holding that removing Navajo Indians from the reservation where they lived
did not violate the Free Exercise Clause).
5. See, e.g., Rodney J. Blackman, Showing the Fly the Way Out-of the Fly-Bottle:
Making Sense of the First Amendment Religion Clauses, 42 U. KAN. L. REv. 285, 407
(1994) (arguing that further application of the reasoning in recent Supreme Court
cases would "render the Free Exercise Clause virtually judicially dead" for minority
religious practices); Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U.
CHi. L. REv. 115, 140 (1992) (arguing that the neutrality principle incorrectly places
"the freedom of citizens to exercise their faith . . . [at the mercy of the] vagaries of
democratic politics . .

. .");

Karen T. White, The Court-Created Conflict of the First

Amendment: Marginalizing Religion and Undermining the Law, 6 U. FLA. J.L. &
PUB. POLY 181, 186-87 (1994) ("In an effort to enforce government neutrality, the
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argued that the Justices are undervaluing the benefits that flow
from genuine religious diversity and that, far from being neutral, the courts treat the religions that lose these cases-usually,
but not always, the powerless-as presumptively false.6 Implicit
in this last criticism is the notion that the Justices likely would
treat their own religions as being at least potentially true. Conduct of the sort demanded by the Western tradition-especially
the Protestant tradition-is immediately recognized as religious;
conduct of other kinds is seen as marginal to religious life. Thus,
the Native Americans involved in Lyng cannot really need the
forests; worship is basically how one prays (so the Justices must
have reasoned), and nobody is interfering with that. Beyond
that, we are free to follow the teachings of our religions up to
the edge of the law but no further-even though the laws are
drafted with some religions, and not others, in mind. (Nobody
proposes to build a road through the Cathedral of St. John the
Divine.) Applied in this manner, the neutrality rule itself becomes a kind of establishment of religion: establishing freedom
for religions that look and operate like the denominations of the
American Protestant tradition.
One need not accept the accuracy of this increasingly common
polemical stance to recognize the seed of an important question.
Some scholars have defended religious freedom on the ground
that because the siate does not know any facts about God, official skepticism (which carries an implicit official invitation to
private pluralism) is the only sensible stand. But consider the
matter the other way around: Over the years, any number of
scholars-Stanley Fish is perhaps the most recent-have questioned whether a deeply religious individual can possibly be
committed to the liberal values of pluralism and dialogue. The
religiously devout, Fish argues, are less interested in participating in the marketplace of ideas than in shutting it down.7 De-

Court has rendered the Free Exercise Clause almost meaningless.").
6.

See STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE

OF DISBELIEF: HoW AMERICAN LAW

AND POLITICS TRVALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993); cf GuiDo CALABRESI, IDEALS,
BELIEFS, AITUDES, AND THE LAW 45-68 (1985) (maintaining that tort law considers
the beliefs of traditional religions to be presumptively reasonable but requires that
members of newer, idiosyncratic religions prove the reasonableness of their beliefs).
7. See Stanley Fish, Why We Can't All Just Get Along, FIRST THINGS, Feb. 1996,
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spite the polemical cast of the argument, it raises a crucial challenge for advocates of religious freedom: to explain why anybody
who is absolutely sure that God exists and is knowable ever
would believe in religious freedom for others, except, perhaps, as
a transitionary tool until the believer and his friends accumulate
enough resources to force everybody else to toe their theological
line. More carefully put, the question is whether only a skeptic
or a nonbeliever could conclude that religious freedom is valuable as a permanent good.'
This conundrum matters-and not simply to religious believers who want to display their tolerance. If Fish and other critics
are right in thinking that true believers cannot truly believe in
religious freedom and religious pluralism as valuable for their
own sake, the ability of the religious to support the liberal state
is called into question because the religious freedom that liberalism trumpets becomes a trivial sideshow rather than one of its
main attractions. After all, if the citizens whom we might call
True Believers cannot support religious freedom, it follows that
those who support religious freedom cannot be fellow True Believers (or, at best, are lying about one or the other of their affirmations). Thus the liberal state suddenly fits the caricature put
forth by many of its critics: a state run by Nonbelievers who tolerate but at bottom scorn the True Believers. So rather than
G.K. Chesterton's famous description of America as "a nation
with the soul of a church," we would have a nation that pretends
to have the soul of a church.
The challenge is more difficult than it may seem. It is not
enough to answer with the traditional response of Christian theology that it is pointless for True Believer to capture the apparatus of the state and coerce Nonbeliever, because God's offer of

at 18; see also Stanley Fish, Liberalism Doesn't Exist, 1987 DUKE L.J. 997 (reply to
Carter) (treating liberalism as incompatible with religious fundamentalism).
8. By a permanent good, I mean one that should exist as long as the society
does, rather than one that should exist until the society evolves in such a way that
the question no longer arises. Free speech, for example, is a permanent good in a
just society. So is the right to vote. An armed guard in a public school is not a permanent good: the guard is there in the hope that the day will come when he will
not be needed, and the very people who decided to put him there also believe the
society will be better when he is no longer needed.
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grace must be accepted voluntarily for the acceptance to have
any effect. The critic could easily reply that this is still merely a
transitional justification for the free exercise of religion, that,
deep down, True Believer remains certain that all is not right
with the world until everybody understands God in the same
way that he does. In other words, True Believer does not believe
in religious freedom in the sense of religious pluralism, and certainly not for its own sake; he believes in pluralism as a necessary interlude before all his fellow citizens are True Believers
too, like a Marxist who thinks the state must wither away before true socialism can take hold. So his true vision of pluralism
is akin to the way that Locke believed in tolerance: tolerance of
all the right ideas about God?
Nor is it enough to respond, as some contemporary theologians have, that religious pluralism is of value even for True
Believer who, by studying the ways in which others have found
the path to God, might gain a richer understanding of his own
faith and his own relationship to the Divine."0 In this case, religious pluralism is useful only as an adjunct to True Believer's
own search; after the search is -concluded, the value of pluralism
to him is no longer clear. Moreover, no matter what True Believer learns from the (false) understandings of others, his ultimate
goal is not a diversity of beliefs; his ultimate goal is that
everybody's understandings be True.
In this Essay, I try to take up Fish's challenge, explaining
why one could fully believe in God-in particular, the transcendent Creator-God common to the great Western religions-and
yet not only believe in religious freedom but also believe in the
value of genuine religious pluralism. The Essay is only a speculation, and a relatively modest one at that. I certainly do not
claim that strong religious belief somehow entails support for
religious freedom and religious pluralism; too much tragic history makes mock of any such claim.

9. See JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 91-93 (Mario Montuori
ed., Martinus Nijhoff 1963) (1689) (proposing to deny religious freedom to Catholics
and atheists).
10. See JAMES C. LIVINGSTON, ANATOMY OF THE SACRED 367-68 (1989).

1632

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:1627

I.
Rather than taking refuge in abstraction, I will from the start
be personal. Let me begin with a profession of my own faith, at
least as much of it as is relevant to the subject matter of the
paper. I will set out that profession of faith as a set of three
principles, only one of which I will subsequently argue for. I
must begin this way because I intend to speculate on what theory of religious freedom we might create were we to begin not
with a neutral or skeptical assumption, but rather with a set of
assumptions about religious truth.
The three principles are these:
(1) God exists. In particular, the transcendent Creator-God familiar to the great Western religions, Christianity, Judaism, and
Islam, exists. And if the Creator-God exists, God has a Nature
and a Will that human beings might dimly perceive.
(2) The human task is to struggle toward God. Although I make
this a separate point, the medieval theologians argued that if
the Creator-God is real and transcendent, it follows that human
beings have an absolute duty to order their lives in accordance
with God's will." If God exists, moreover, then God's will is not
relative but absolute: God wills X, not Y, and all those who
think God wills Y rather than X are wrong. So the human task
is to discern X and then do it. This, of course, is a vision of what
form of life is best for people, and might therefore seem to be
forbidden as a motivating force of the liberal state. But this is
true only if the struggle toward God is defined in a way that
limits rather than exalts human possibility; more to the point, if
it is only a description rather than a prescription, it need make
no difference whatever in the choices or conduct of any particular individual.
These first two premises, although not of course shared by everybody, at least have the virtue of being relatively

11. See 17 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE Ia Zae. q. 7-10 (Thomas
Gilby, ed. & trans., McGraw-Hill 1970).
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uncontroversial among professional theologians. Acceptance of
the third, however, might require (dare I say it?) a leap of
faith-or at least, for the moment, a suspension of disbelief.
(3) Individual humans and their faith communities are better
able than the state to discern the will of God. Even if we conclude, as I did a moment ago, that God wills X, not Y, and all
those who think God wills Y rather than X are wrong, it does
not follow that the state is the proper level at which to distinguish X from Y. On the contrary, for the state to differentiate X
from Y would actually hinder rather than help the search for
God's true will. Why? Because the state has no comparative advantage over the individual in discerning God's will. (Indeed,
although I will not argue for the proposition here, there is reason to think that the state is almost certain to be less adept
than the individual at discerning God's will. 2 ) Thus the task of
the state is to assist believers in discerning and doing God's will
by the simple expedient of getting out of the way.
I emphasize that I am only asserting these principles, not deriving them. They are my own profession of faith, a tiny part of
what I believe about God's relationship to humanity, but they
nevertheless can serve as the starting point in constructing an
answer to Stanley Fish. To do so, it is necessary to follow two
steps: First, I will make the case that the believer who begins,
as I do, with these principles could (and perhaps should) support
a robust religious pluralism, which cannot exist without clear
constitutional guarantees. Second, I will argue that the law of

12. The problem is at least twofold. First, and perhaps more obvious, the facts
necessary to understand the Will and Nature of God are not facts to which the state
has any special access. Second, unless one supposes that a majority has a comparative advantage over the individual in discerning the Will of God, the state's ability
to aggregate preferences does not yield a better result than the one that the individual might reach. Naturally, a community of believers meeting in church or synagogue might, through corporate worship, reach a richer understanding than any believer alone; indeed, the shared activity of worship is often essential to the work of
extending the religious narrative. But unless the state is essentially theocratic, and
acts of democracy are essentially about God-worship, the state cannot fairly be
analogized to a community of believers. (The literature on civil religion is not to the
contrary because it supposes a substitution of state-worship for God-worship.)

1634

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:1627

the state, including the constitutional law, can begin from the
same set of principles and reach the same strongly
pro-religious-freedom result but without the damage to religious practice that flows from the current Court's attachment to
neutrality. I will offer a preliminary sketch of what that law
might look like.
Again, bear in mind that all of this is only speculation. I do
not pretend that the approach I am investigating is free of problems. As will be seen, some of the answers that it provides to
our religious freedom dilemmas are unsettling, at least to
me-particularly on the matter of how to resolve religious objections to antidiscrimination laws. But most of the answers turn
out to be either better than those our current jurisprudence is
able to provide, or every bit as good, yet more solidly grounded.
Indeed, the approach to religious freedom that presupposes the
existence of the Creator-God provides the maximum protection
for the freedom of individuals and, at the same time, protects
the crucial work of faith communities
struggling together toward
13
Divine.
the
of
vision
truer
a
II.
Suppose that True Believer shares my principles. Will he nevertheless wind up where Fish insists that he must, disdaining
pluralism and dialogue? Certainly True Believer's confidence
that God exists might be seen as a problem rather than a solution: Will he not be tempted to follow the example of the Inquisitors, coercing Nonbeliever for Nonbeliever's own benefit? Indeed
he might, were the first principle the only one in which he believed. But we are supposing that he also believes in the next
two. How might this modify his thinking?

13. The approach that presupposes the existence of God does not in any sense
discriminate against the atheist or the agnostic. In the first place, its practical effect
is to defend, and in some ways to enhance, the rights of atheists to exercise religion
freely by not exercising it at all. Second, from the theological perspective, one can
argue that there are no atheists. As Martin Buber pointed out in his wonderful
monograph Between Man and Man, the atheist is in some ways closer to God than
the believer, for the atheist engages in wrestling with the divine, an activity to
which all too few believers attend, and to which all should. See MARTIN BUBER, BETWEEN MAN AND MAN (Ronald Gregor Smith trans., 1965).
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A quick glance at the second principle might suggest that it
will only make matters worse. If the human task is to struggle
toward God, and if Nonbeliever is refusing to engage in that
struggle, perhaps True Believer helps her if he coerces her into
the struggle that she has been avoiding. But if True Believer
acts in this fashion, he ignores the Gospel admonition to attend
first to the beam in his own eye,' 4 and one need not be a Christian to see the point. If the human task is to struggle toward
God, then the image is one not of a destination but of a journey-and quite a difficult one at that. Nonbeliever is not alone
in her need to make the trip. True Believer has the same obligation. If True Believer thinks he has reached the end of the path
toward God, he ignores the point about (Created) human nature
that the second principle expounds. Because the journey is a
struggle, and because human beings are fallible, True Believer
may err. One might object that the possibility of error is no more
conclusive an argument against religious coercion than it is
against coercion of any other kind, and this would be correct,
except that we are beginning with the premise that God indeed
exists (principle 1) and that the human task is to struggle toward God (principle 2). Consequently, the cost (to both True Believer and Nonbeliever) of coercion in service of an erroneous
religious conclusion is significantly greater than the cost of coercion in service of an erroneous conclusion about some (literally)
mundane question. At minimum, therefore, the possibility of
error is reason enough for True Believer to pause to contemplate
the possibility that Nonbeliever has access to more of the truth
than True Believer does.
Do not misunderstand the point: this is not relativism. True
Believer, by accepting principles 1 and 2, takes as given not only
that God exists, but that God's Will is an absolute, and that that
absolute Will is knowable if we can develop the proper tools.
True Believer, by definition, believes that he has everything figured right, and-who knows?-he may even be correct, which is
why so humane a theologian as Martin Buber wondered whether
any of us is truly in a position to challenge, for example, Calvin's

14. See Matthew 7:3 (King James) ("And why beholdest thou the mote that is in
thy brother's eye, but considerest not the beam that is in thine own eye?").
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persecution of Servetus. 5 But Buber missed an insight that is
present in his own work: because of our human fallibility, our
access to God is by definition imperfect. That is why Calvin
should have paused, and it is also why True Believer should
pause.
But a pause is not a final decision. Having thought it over,
True Believer might decide to proceed with his coercion of Nonbeliever. After all, if the lack of certainty were an argument
against action, few of us-save a few fanatics-would ever act.
Even convictions that we might be prepared to revisit are convictions. 6 And as long as the convictions have endured the degree
of moral reflection and challenge that personal integrity requires, True Believer should ultimately feel free to act on
them. 7 Or rather, he should feel free to act on them unless his
sense of his own fallibility is further buttressed by an additional
principle-for example, our third principle.
On the issue of coercion of Nonbeliever by True Believer, the
third principle would seem to be decisive. By hypothesis, the
state is less able than the individual to discern the proper path
toward God. This means that even if True Believer is sure he is
right and Nonbeliever wrong, he must not involve the state as
an organized entity in trying to enforce his preference. The reason is not that he must respect Nonbeliever's "rights" (although,
of course, the citizen in me believes that he should) but that the
state is, according to the third principle, incompetent to make
the very judgment that True Believer requires of it. Put simply,
if he enlists the aid of the state, the state is likely to mess
things up.
Here one draws upon the observations of Kierkegaard, who
pointed out that as the Christian church in Europe became the
Christian state, it lost its distinctively religious character." In

15. See BUBER, supra note 13, at 7.
16. As legal scholar Michael Perry has put the point, "at any given moment our
convictions are what they are." MICHAEL J. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, AND LAW
184 (1988).
17. For a further discussion on this point, see STEPHEN L. CARTER, INTEGRITY 1529 (1996).
18. See SOREN KIERKEGAARD, ATTACK UPON "CHRISTENDOM" (Walter Lowrie trans.,
Princeton Univ. Press 1968) (1854-55).

1997]

FREE EXERCISE

1637

particular, a state "church" loses much of its ability to bear witness to the sinfulness of the world and the state that runs it.
Religion, as the postmodern theologian David Tracy has pointed
out, is ultimately subversive of the secular world because it provides narratives drawing on sources other than the material.19
Religions live through their narratives: they exist as constantly
evolving stories about the relationship of the people with God. A
religion is purified--comes to know its own narrative most fully-through its opposition to the world, through tension with
those who stand against it and, ultimately, by the sacrifices that
life may demand. As the late legal scholar Robert Cover explained, it is the process of standing in opposition to an often
disbelieving and even oppressive world that helps a religious
people to understand itself, for it is the experience of being the
other that teaches the religion what aspects of its narrative it
will preserve even when a sacrifice is demanded." Some forms
of sacrifice are readily understood as such by secular observers:
the lynching of Roman Catholics in nineteenth-century America,
the slaughter of Christian missionaries in various parts of the
Far East, and, most notably, the Holocaust. One may go back
further and consider, in the Western tradition, the slaughters of
Jews and Christians alike at the hands of the Romans. All of
these sacrifices resonate with us, because they touch the profound secular fear of death.
But most of the sacrifices that life in subversive opposition
demands of the religious may often seem trivial to outsiders-consider not only Lyng, but the unhappy rhetoric of the
Supreme Court in Goldman v. Weinberger,2 in which an Air
Force officer was disciplined for wearing a yarmulke and the
Justices were unable to find a serious free exercise question.
Similarly, I doubt that most outsiders know or care why adherents of Santerfa sacrifice animals, but what should be striking is
that no matter how many prosecutions are brought under the
animal protection statutes, the santeros continue to do it. 2
19. See
20. See
21. 475
22. See
(1993).

DAVID TRACY, PLURALITY AND AMBIGUITY 74 (1987).
Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 50-53 (1983).
U.S. 503 (1986).
Church of The Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520
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Plainly, they are sufficiently determined that secular criticism,
and even secular punishment, will not stop them, and no wonder; in the Santerfa theology, the orisha, the personal god who
influences the fate of a given individual, will die if the sacrifices
end. This willingness to resist the destruction of its narrative is
crucial for religious survival; in the words of David Tracy, "the
religions live by resisting."' Not only do they live, but they
take on meaning: Robert Cover's point was that a religion lives
and grows in part through discovering, in this dialectical way,
what in its narrative is truly important and truly valued, and
what, although perhaps a part of the tradition, it is willing to
alter or even to yield.' The point is not that oppression is good,
but that for a religion determined to preserve its best self, tension is inevitable.
As the religion grows more powerful, it may sacrifice less, and
thus may lose its purity. As someone once said, when the church
gained temporal power, it surrendered the power to die for its
beliefs in return for the power to kill for its beliefs. This is bad
for religion. The reason is not that coercion on matters of faith is
inherently wrong, although nearly all theologians now agree
that it is. And, as I mentioned already, the reason also is not
that Nonbeliever must accept God voluntarily, although all theologians agree on that too. The reason is that when the church
seizes the reins of temporal power, it loses its distinctively religious character, its apartness, the subversive aspect of which
Tracy writes. This means that once True Believer is in a position
to coerce Nonbeliever, he has lost the ability to sacrifice, and
thus his belief may be less pure, which means that he can never
be certain that he is still True Believer.
There is a remaining possibility. Even if True Believer, fearing a loss of integrity, does not seize the apparatus of the state
to coerce Nonbeliever, might he and his fellow True Believers
join forces to coerce Nonbeliever without the aid of the state?
Sadly, this is not an uncommon occurrence, even in the United
States. American citizens, for example, have engaged in acts of
violence and intimidation against Mormons, who were shot and

23. TRACY, supra note 19, at 84.
24. See Cover, supra note 20, at 50-53.
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burned during the nineteenth century, and Jews and Roman
Catholics, whom we have lynched by the score. Suppose True
Believer, persuaded that seizing the apparatus of the state will
be to his religious disadvantage, uses unofficial coercion instead?
The answer is that the same objection applies: once he embarks
upon the path of coercion, True Believer still risks losing his
access to the Truth. The state, famously, is a fiction; it is the
ability'to apply force to attain one's ends that produces the set of
phenomena that we call the state. Possession of the sole privilege of applying force has been, since Hobbes, the defining characteristic of the state.' It is the application of force, not the
happenstance that one is able to apply it with legitimate authority, that generates the power that destroys the specialness of
religion. So, for our practical purposes, if True Believer can
coerce Nonbeliever without risk, he is acting with or as the
state, and thus should be less certain of his ground.
III.
If I am correct that the True Believer who accepts all three of
my principles would (or at least could) decide not to coerce Nonbeliever, can we generalize the argument, and thus derive a law
rather than a practice of religious freedom? I believe that we
can, by using the identical principles, produce a law of religious
freedom that is better in most respects (although worse in a few)
than the law that the courts have produced by invoking the
principle of neutrality. By combining the three principles, it is
possible to derive a single general principle that we might call
Religious Freedom Because God Exists. The first principle tells
us that God exists. The second affirms that the human task is to
struggle toward this existing God. The third holds that the state
cannot determine the path of the struggle as well as individuals
and their faith communities can. This suggests that the role of
the state is to get out of the way-a role that the Framers would
have recognized at once, and warmly endorsed.26 Indeed, if we
begin with the proposition that we have religious freedom be-

25. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 139-44 (E.P. Dutton & Co. 1950) (1651).
26. See WILLIAM LEE MILLER, THE FIRST LIBERTY 3-7 (1986).
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cause God is real, not because of skepticism about that fact, we
might continue our speculation with the conclusion that no state
interest is as important as furthering the spiritual life of its citizens, whose purpose in life, after all, is to struggle toward God.
The resulting principle can be stated this way:
(4) The state must allow every individual and faith community
the maximum freedom to struggle toward God.
Of course-because to do anything else, to exalt other interests over the struggle toward God would violate what, in the
second principle, we have seen as the purpose of human existence. This principle is not entirely new, although I hope to do
some new things with it. Historically, the principle is a sensible
one; it is worthy of further exploration precisely because it was
common (although perhaps not dominant) at the time of the
drafting of the First Amendment. Indeed, the general notion of
analyzing religious freedom as though God exists may be, for
me, an article of religious faith, but it also was once a more general understanding. It underlies James Madison's 1785 A Memorial and Remonstrance,27 his protest against Patrick Henry's
bill for mandatory collection for the support of all churches in
Virginia, and a crucial document in the nation's religious history; for A Memorial and Remonstrance was premised precisely on
the thesis that the individual, not the state, is the proper level
at which to discern the will of God.
A Memorial and Remonstrance was in no sense skeptical; it
proclaimed proudly that the human obligation to God is superior
to the human obligation to the state, and that the state itself is
subordinate to God. Moreover, Madison's central defense of religious freedom presupposed the truth of God's existence: "Whilst
we assert for ourselves a freedom to embrace, to profess and to
observe the Religion which we believe to be of divine origin, we
cannot deny an equal freedom to those whose minds have not
yet yielded to the evidence which has convinced us."' Why not?

27. JAMES MADISON, A MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE (1785), reprintedin MILLER,
supra note 26, at 359.
28. Id. at 360-61.
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Because their refusal to believe what is plainly true "is an offence against God, not against man."29 Similarly, Thomas
Jefferson's Bill for EstablishingReligious Freedom0 denied the
state the power to coerce belief on the clearly stated ground that
coercion is against God's plan.
Much recent scholarship asserts that historians of the religion
clauses focus too narrowly on Madison and Jefferson, and thus
minimize the Framers' debt to Roger Williams."' But the idea
that religious freedom is valuable because God exists is consistent (and may be the only First Amendment theory that is consistent) with Roger Williams's original notion of the garden and
the wilderness, with the metaphorical wall standing to separate
the garden (the church) from the wilderness (the rest of the
world). 2 To Williams, it was the garden, not the wilderness,
that was precious and in need of protection: the wilderness
would have to look after itself. When the wall was breached,
Williams argued, the people in the garden had the duty to go out
33
into the wilderness and make it a part of the garden. For Williams, the wall of separation protected the church until its members were prepared for the work of evangelizing, of transforming
the world according to their religious understanding. Once the
wall was breached, then, the wilderness had to take its chances.
The separation metaphor, as originally articulated, actually
makes little sense if one begins with skepticism on the existence
of God. If religion is simply one of many equally valuable (or
valueless) activities that some individuals see as enriching their

29. Id. at 361.
30. THOMAS JEFFERSON, A BILL FOR ESTABLISHING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1777),
reprinted in MILLER, supra note 26, at 357.
31. See MILLER, supra note 26, at 153-224; Timothy L. Hall, Roger Williams and
the Foundations of Religious Liberty, 71 B.U. L. REV. 455, 457-61 (1991). This point
goes back to MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 1-31 (1965)

(arguing that Williams's evangelical approach was more influential on the First
Amendment Religion Clauses than was Jefferson's skeptical rationalism).
32. See ROGER WILLIAMS, MR. COTTONS LETTER LATELY PRINTED, EXAMINED AND
ANSWERED (1644), reprinted in 1 THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF ROGER WILLIAMS 392

(1963) ("[Wlhen they have opened a gap in the hedge or wall of Separation between
the Garden of the Church and the Wildernes[s] of the world, God hath ever broke
down the wall [itself] removed the Candle[sitick, . . . and made his Garden a
Wilderne[ss], as at this day.").
33. See id. at 392.
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lives, there is no evident reason to grant it a level of protection
that others are denied: there is, for example, no separation of art
and state. But if God is real, if that is the reason to separate
church and state, then it is easy to see how the search for God's
true Will is aided when the garden-the church, the faith community where people work together to unlock God's Will-is protected. Behind the wall, believers struggle together toward God,
as the second principle directs. They are able to do so in peace
because the state, having derived the fourth principle, leaves
them alone.
Besides, only if we take this fourth principle to be true can we
make sense of the Court's otherwise historically inept effort to
incorporate the Establishment Clause against the states, the
very entities it was designed to protect.34 The Clause was
adopted as part of the division of powers between the state and
national sovereignties: the states could establish churches if
they chose, but the federal government could not. 5 Simple incorporation-the argument that the unincorporated clause limited the federal government, so the incorporated clause limits the
states-was always incoherent, not least because it is difficult to
figure out how to construct a state-level equivalent: established
churches by county or city, perhaps, but not by state? It never
made any sense.3"
But suppose that we view the Framers as preferring state establishments over national establishments, not to placate states
with official churches, but because of a normative belief that the
judgment about the proper path to take in the struggle toward
God would be better made at the state than at the federal level.
(There is actually some evidence, although it is thin, that this
was an important rationale for the Clause."7 ) Now incorpora34. I am here accepting, for the sake of argument and coherence, the idea that
there are indeed two religion clauses-an Establishment Clause and a Free Exercise
Clause-in the First Amendment, although I must add that I am largely persuaded
by recent scholarship that there is actually only one. See, e.g., Blackman, supra note
5, at 285.
35. See Philip B. Kurland, The Origins of the Religion Clauses of the Constitution,
27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 839, 843-44 (1986).

36. For further discussion of this point, see Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights
as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1159-60 (1991).
37. See JOHN H. GARVEY & FREDERICK SCHAUER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 368
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tion might be justified on the argument that we simply are extending the Framers' work: they thought that the state was the
right level at which to determine God's Will, but they were mistaken. It is the nature of government, not the nature of federal
government, that renders the determination difficult. The right
level, then, is the individual and the faith community. And,
again, that is the level at which the state must not interfere.
The devil is in the details, and the question is what it means
to say that the wilderness-the state-must leave the garden
alone. At the time of the drafting of the First Amendment, the
government apparatus (at least at the federal level) did little
that could conceivably get in the way of the struggle toward
God. In today's regulated society, however, the state gets in the
way of almost everything, in the sense that few areas of life escape the administrative apparatus. I am not decrying this trend;
I am merely describing it. Whatever one thinks of life in the regulated state, one thing should be clear: as applied in the contemporary world, the fourth principle will be strongly
accommodationist, meaning that it will require the state to carve
out exemptions from many, and perhaps most, of its general
regulations when they interfere with the struggle toward God.
For example, the Lyng decision, 8 which allowed the Forest
Service to destroy the religion of three Indian tribes as long as it
was done by accident, could hardly survive a principle holding
that the state must allow the maximum freedom to struggle toward God. Although we have not yet considered the question of
what interests might overcome the individual's need to struggle
in his or her own way (the speculative answer will be a provocative one), it should be plain that the desires of a logging company to cut, of the Forest Service to profit, and of consumers to get
wood products are not, singly or in combination, similar in importance to the need of the members of the tribes to fulfill the
purpose of their existence by struggling, along their own path,
toward God.39 To rule otherwise would be to suppose that the
(1992); MILLER, supra note 26, at 297-99.
38. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
39. It is worth noting here that the legislative history of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994), the 1993 statute purporting
to reverse the alarming trend of court decisions I have been discussing, expressly
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path toward God that the tribes have chosen is not likely to be
an effective one-precisely the judgment that the third principle
deems the state incompetent to render.
IV.
How would the law of the religion clauses look under this
principle? I will consider this question by examining a handful
of difficult areas of church-state law, beginning with the matter
already under discussion: religious exemptions to laws of general
application. That is where the courts have done the greatest
damage, not only to minority (that is, politically powerless) religions such as the Native American faith involved in Lyng, but
also, as Angela Carmella has pointed out, to some aspects of
mainstream Christianity.4 ° Although bad accommodation decisions exist in many areas of life, some of the most analytically
interesting ones-and the ones that will be most helpful in figuring out what might overcome the working of the third principle-involve discrimination. American religion has a long history
of segregation, especially on the basis of race. Three decades
ago, Martin Luther King, Jr. referred to Sunday morning at

preserves the result in Lyng and several other difficult cases. See S. REP. NO. 103111, at 8-13 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1897-903. I shall return to
RFRA in the last part of this Essay.
40. See Angela C. Carmella, A Theological Critique of Free Exercise Jurisprudence,
60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 782, 788 (1992). Carmella in fact makes a richer point. She
argues persuasively that scholars of religious freedom, including accommodationists
like myself, have been so hypnotized by the judicial abandonment of the free exercise rights of religious minorities that they have overlooked the fact that the courts
have already abandoned protection of the free exercise rights of religions that did
not somehow mark their separateness from the world. See id. Relatively
"acculturated" religions (to use the term popularized by H. Richard Niebuhr in
Christ and Culture (1951)) lost judicial protection by not fitting the judicial model of
religion, which requires something exotic. See id. at 787. She gives the example of
Needham Pastoral Counseling Center, Inc. v. Board of Appeals, 557 N.E.2d 43 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1990), in which an organization that offered counseling services for coping
with depression and stress was denied status as a religious group for zoning purposes because its counselors, in addition to offering prayer and other religious assistance, used some methods also used by secular counselors. See id. at 46-47. According to Carmella, had the counselors used only methods that the court considered
religious, such as laying on of hands, rather than a mix of secular and religious
techniques, the Center's use would have qualified as religious. See Carmella, supra,
at 790.
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11:00 as "the most segregated hour of the week"-and, sadly, it
still is. Although the Southern Baptist Convention in 1995
adopted a resolution apologizing and asking forgiveness for its
past support of racism,4 the fact remains that the SBC was
founded before the Civil War precisely to enable the racist
southern churches to escape the interference of northern Baptists who were pressing for an end to slavery.
As a de jure matter, religious entities, in most of their operations, are nowadays subject to the prohibitions of Title VII,
which forbids employment discrimination on the basis of, among
other grounds, race and sex.42 Title VII exempts religious employers from its prohibition on discrimination on the ground of
religion, an exemption that the courts have sustained against
constitutional challenge.43 But outside of the central operations
of the faith-the selection of clergy, for example-the courts (and
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission) have been
reasonably consistent in requiring religious organizations to
meet the other requirements of Title VII." There are bemusing
exceptions, such as the federal court that, rather than ruling on
a sex discrimination challenge to a hiring preference for Jesuits
in the Marquette University theology department, dismissed the
action on the ground that the plaintiff would not have been
hired even had she been a man.4 5 Why not? Because she was
avowedly pro-choice and the Catholic Church is officially pro-life.
The exceptions matter, but in order to decide whether or when

41. See Gustav Niebuhr, Baptist Group Votes To Repent Stand on Slaves, N.Y.
TIMES, June 21, 1995, at Al.
42. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (1994).
43. See Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334-40 (1987).
44. See, e.g., Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d
1164, 1171 (4th Cir. 1985) ("[Eimployment decisions [of religious organizations] may
be subject to Title VII scrutiny, where the decision does not involve the church's
spiritual functions."); EEOC v. Pacific Press Publ'g Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir.
1982) (holding that a religious publishing house could not provide unequal pay to its
female employees or terminate an employee for violating church doctrine, regardless
of whether the actions were based on the employer's religious beliefs); McClure v.
Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558 (5th Cir. 1972) (finding that the exemption does
not allow religious employers to discriminate on the basis of sex, race, color, or national origin in furtherance of a sectarian hiring policy).
45. See Maguire v. Marquette Univ., 814 F.2d 1213, 1218 (7th Cir. 1987).
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there should be any, we must first construct a theory. Our
fourth principle-that the state's job is to get out of the way of
believers and their faith communities-helps put us on the right
path. Bear in mind that the question is not, quite, whether religious groups should be able to discriminate; or rather, that is
the question, but the word "discriminate" does not carry the
same meaning as it does in more objectionable contexts. A religion may discriminate in favor of its members in the same way
that a family may do so: the law recognizes, in both cases, that a
valuable institution may not survive if not permitted to define
and nurture its own vision of community. A Religion that cannot
call its own members to service (even to the exclusion of others)
will shortly lose the virtues of religion. The value of religion to
democracy, as I pointed out earlier and have argued in detail
elsewhere, is defined by its differences, by its often subversive
powers of dissent.46 Religions that are pressed to create themselves in the image of the surrounding society will cease to offer
to their adherents a different set of meanings from those
authored by the state and thus will cease to be the communities
of resistance against the state that they must, at their best, become. Pressure of this kind is the essence of totalitarianism.
All of this may seem a merely utilitarian justification for
keeping the state's hands off; critics have derided it as no more
than an argument that religions must be free because they are
useful." Under the fourth principle, however, the same result
obtains-only more strongly. For now it does not matter whether
the state understands the value of religions to its own democratic aspirations. In the state that begins with the proposition that
the Creator-God exists and successfully derives the fourth principle, the need to leave the religions free to constitute their own
communities without interference will be axiomatic, for it more
or less restates that principle.
This does not mean that religious groups should be free to

46. See CARTER, supra note 6, at 23-43, 124-35.
47. See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understandingof Free
Exercise of Religion, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1409, 1442 (1990) ("[Eighteenth-century]
evangelicals found this very mode of argument objectionable, because it implied that
religion was to be used as an instrument of statecraft, thus implicitly subordinating
religion to the goal of 'political prosperity.").
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discriminate on any ground that they choose, but the state
should, in interfering with their freedoms, tread warily. Even
under the neutrality principle, the courts formerly understood
this, often requiring that the government show a very strong
interest-in some cases, the word "compelling" was used-in
order to justify an interference with religious freedom." Consequently, the courts analyzed religious freedom claims under the
same balancing tests used in other areas of constitutional
law.49 The Court lately has abandoned the compelling interest
standard in such cases,5" a move the Congress has tried but
(largely) failed to overrule with RFRA.5"
If, however, we have religious freedom because God is real,
and if the duty of the state in such matters is to get out of the
way of believers as they struggle toward God, we would naturally conclude that the state can interfere with religious freedom
only in the rarest of cases. The interesting question is what the
correct standard then would be. In order to winkle it out, it is
useful to begin with the one case that the religious claimant lost
but that virtually every religious freedom supporter agrees was
decided the right way: the Supreme Court's 1983 decision in Bob
Jones University v. United States.52
In Bob Jones, a religious university was threatened with the
loss of its tax-exempt status because of its racially discriminatory practices." The university argued that because racial separation was a part of its religious belief, it was immune from
state punishment. The Justices brushed this argument aside. In
finding the federal government's interest in eradicating racial
48. See Thomas v. Review Bd. of
718 (1981); New Life Baptist Church
940, 944-46 (1st Cir. 1989).
49. See Hobbie v. Unemployment
("[I]nfringements [upon free exercise
ny .. . .").

the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707,
Academy v. Town of E. Longmeadow, 885 F.2d
Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987)
of religion] must be subjected to strict scruti-

50. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882-90 (1990).
51. One of the purposes for which Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act was "to restore the compelling interest test... and to guarantee its
application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened."
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (1994).
52. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
53. Bob Jones University maintained a policy that prohibited interracial dating
and marriage. See id. at 580-81.
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discrimination to be superior to the religious university's claim
of a free exercise right to engage in racial discrimination, the
Supreme Court was nevertheless cautious, taking pains to set
forth in some detail the nation's odious racial history. Analytically, the question was whether the interest in overcoming that
history was compelling, which is, among available balancing
tests, the highest standard to which the Justices ever hold a
state action. The courts have lately retreated from endorsing the
notion that overcoming our racist history is compelling (that is
certainly one way to read Hopwood v. Texas54 ), but by the time
the case was argued the university had few defenders. When the
Court announced its judgment in Bob Jones, even the Reagan
Administration was not heard to complain.
My mention of the Reagan Administration is not intended as
an ad hominem. The 1980 Republican Party platform quite
openly took the school's side against the Internal Revenue Service, the government body that was pursuing, in the words of
the platform, a "vendetta."55 Not long after taking office, the
Reagan Administration announced its intention to change IRS
policy and grant tax exemptions to racially discriminatory private schools." But later on, under tremendous public pressure,
the Administration reversed itself.57 As we try to determine
what should qualify as a compelling interest if we begin with
the assumption that religious freedom exists because God is
real, the fact of this public pressure may be the central fact of
the case. The truly interesting question may be not precisely
why the Justices found the interest in eradicating racial discrimination to be compelling-the Court never quite tells us

54. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996). In Hopwood, the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals struck down a law school's affirmative action program, finding that "a state does not have a compelling state interest in remedying
the present effects of past societal discrimination." Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 949.
55. See Martin Schram & Charles R. Babcock, Reagan Advisers Missed School
Case Sensitivity, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 1982, at Al (reporting that the 1980 Republican platform sought to eliminate the IRS policy of denying tax exemptions to independent segregated schools).
56. See Stuart Taylor, Jr., U.S. Drops Rule on Tax Penalty for Racial Bias, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 9, 1982, at 1.
57. See Lee Lescaze, Reagan Submits Bill Denying Tax Breaks to Segregated
Schools, WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 1982, at Al.

1997]

FREE EXERCISE

1649

that-but rather why the public was so certain that the Justices
were right.
After all, if we begin with the notion that we have religious
freedom because the Creator-God exists, it is not obvious that
the religions should even be subject to our most basic
antidiscrimination laws. Might such regulations not interfere
with the ability of a religious community to struggle toward
God? In my own role as True Believer, I might scoff at the religious claim, certain that I understand the Divine Will better
than Bob Jones University does, and that God commands racial
equality, not racial division. But the third principle tells us that
this argument is out of bounds. My passions tell me as an African American-and an American-that nobody should be exempt from laws on racial discrimination; my intellect offers
reasons for this, and my common sense points out that any exemption will be used in our racially troubled nation as the pretext for much that is horrid. But here I must return to an earlier
analogy, for the speculative side of my nature wonders why a
church should be more regulated on this point than a family-and a family is not regulated at all. You may (as most of us
do) host racially segregated parties; you may (and most of us do)
choose close friends, loves, and spouses exclusively from within
your own racial group; you may (as most of us do) attend religious services at a church or synagogue or temple that is, as the
courts say in the school cases, racially identifiable. You or I or
anyone may do all of these things and, because we value so
highly the autonomy of the family, we do not punish it and,
indeed, do not even think it odd.
But if we have religious freedom because God exists, I suspect
that our certainty that we do not want our religious groups to be
free to discriminate on this ground-race-over which so much
blood has been spilled might represent a national theological
judgment. Perhaps we are dressing up in the language of "compelling state interest" the shared conclusion that God-this real,
extant, and transcendent Creator-God--does not in fact will
racial prejudice. Perhaps we conclude that God wills racial
equality. So we are unafraid to punish the churches that preach
race hatred because we are, deep inside, certain that they are
wrong: not just morally wrong, but theologically wrong. In other
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words, this is the rare case, one of the very few and perhaps the
only one, on which we as a nation have reached an enforceable
consensus on the Will of God: we are sure that God wants equality. We are, in practice, True Believers. Small wonder, then, that
we seem a little bit fanatical on the subject.
Now this, admittedly, is heady stuff. I take the argument in
this direction not because I am certain it is the only explanation,
but because the speculation helps us to understand why another
line of cases is so terribly wrong and dangerous. I have in mind
the cases on whether religious landlords who consider fornication an offense against God may discriminate against putative
fornicators in renting their property.58 Cases of this kind are
surprisingly common, because many states have adopted laws
that forbid discrimination in housing on the basis of marital
status. Even though most of those laws originally were adopted
in order to protect single people, they are being used with growing frequency by couples who wish to live together, as we used
to say, without benefit of clergy.59
Now, let us agree, for the sake of argument, that it generally
is wrong to discriminate against couples on the basis of marital
status. On the other hand, in a nation facing a moral crisis sufficiently acute that each politician falls over the next to insist on
the value of the traditional family, it is far from ridiculous, and
certainly it is not invidious, to offer some forms of preferential
treatment for married couples. In fact, nearly every state, including every state that bans discrimination on the basis of
marital status, has some policies that grant to married couples

58. See, e.g., Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274 (Alaska
1994) (per curiam), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 460 (1994); Smith v. Fair Employment &
Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1996); Attorney General v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d
233 (Mass. 1994).
59. Let me pause to make clear that I am here speaking only of heterosexual
couples. Discrimination in housing on the basis of sexual orientation has always
struck me as a variety of simple sex discrimination, to wit, were one of these individuals the opposite sex, the landlord would be willing to rent. The fact that sexual
orientation discrimination might be covered by an anti-sex-discrimination ordinance
does not answer the question of whether the state's interest is sufficiently compelling
to overcome a religious freedom defense. In my book The Culture of Disbelief, however, I offer a preliminary answer, employing a version of some of the tools discussed
in this section of the paper. See CARTER, supra note 6, at 153-55.
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benefits that are denied to everybody else.6 ° Does this simply
show a foolish inconsistency that need not long detain us? I
think not: I think it shows that the states themselves do not
believe that their interest in banning discrimination on the basis
of marital status is compelling.
Justice Clarence Thomas raised this point in 1994 in his lonely dissent from the denial of certiorari in Swanner v. Anchorage
Equal Rights Commission.6 Swanner raised the very issue I
have been discussing, and the Supreme Court of Alaska held
that the state did indeed have a compelling interest to support
its prohibition. As Justice Thomas pointed out, however, not
only does Alaska itself discriminate on this supposedly forbidden
ground, but no court has ever held discrimination on the subject
of marital status to be subject to anything other than the "rational basis" test, the lowest level of equal protection scrutiny.
More important, to conclude that discrimination on the basis
of marital status is as compelling as discrimination on the basis
of race is to trivialize our nation's twin racial histories, one of
oppression, the other of triumph-or, as I might prefer to say,
one of national sin, the other of national redemption. The depredations of slavery and Jim Crow (and, in a different way, of the
routing and imprisoning of the Indian nations) are unique historical events. We have, quite famously, not yet come to terms
with the legacy of the history; the truth is, we have not yet come
to terms with the history itself. We are a strange nation to celebrate with such fanfare the lives of the men who preserved slavery in the Constitution when much of the rest of the world was
trying to abandon it, and our strange nation is full of peculiar
states that celebrate the lives of the men who fought in armed
struggle to protect the peculiar institution.
What is most intriguing about the marital status cases, however, is that the claimed compelling state interest lacks the
enthusiastic popular endorsement of the kind that backs the
anti-racial discrimination principle invoked in Bob Jones.
There is no public clamor for us to fight against marital status

60. See David L. Chambers, What If? The Legal Consequences of Marriage and the
Legal Needs of Lesbian and Gay Male Couples, 95 MICH. L. REV. 447, 452-85 (1996).
61. 115 S. Ct. 460 (1994).
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discrimination a national war of such moral significance that
every entity, even the religions, must sometimes yield. If we
have religious freedom because God exists, this might imply that
we as a nation are not prepared to establish the supervening
theological principle that sexual relations outside of marriage
are a part of the Divine Plan.
True Believer, even if persuaded to accept our three (now
four) principles, might not be troubled by the discovery of a
connection between popular understanding of the Divine Will
and the existence of a compelling interest. The reason is that
True Believer might reasonably decide, in light of the fourth
principle, that no merely secular state interest is ever sufficient
to trump religious freedom: for the state to keep its hands off
religion could mean that the state must always keep its hands
off. The legal scholar Kathleen Sullivan has argued that the
state must keep the peace among the religions,62 and True Believer might be persuaded of this. More likely, however, he
would conclude that peace is less important than the struggle
toward God; or rather, that if peace is necessary in order to
struggle toward God, it is necessary because that is the way that
God wants it.
This, of course, is not only heady but dangerous stuff: any talk
of a link between compelling state interests and popular understanding of the Divine sounds like what the neutrality principle
calls an establishment of religion and what the proposition we
have been investigating, religious freedom because God exists,
would deem a violation of the third principle. By hypothesis, the
state is not supposed to care what individuals believe that God
wills; if a concern for popular theological opinion becomes the
basis for the compelling state interest standard, surely the entire model collapses. But the argument is not that popular religious belief does or should form the basis for the judicial conclusion that a compelling interest exists; the argument is merely
that popular religious belief may make the judicial conclusion
(whatever its actual source) more acceptable to the public.

62. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REV.
195, 222 (1992).
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V.
From this perspective, the notion that religious freedom exists
because God is real may be better able than neutrality to explain the cases in which parents are punished for choosing religion-based rather than medicine-based care for their sick children. Take as an example McKown v. Lundman, s in which the
Supreme Court early in 1996 denied certiorari on a petition
raising a free exercise challenge to Minnesota's wrongful death
award of $1.5 million to the biological father of eleven-year-old
Ian Lundman, who died after his mother and step-father, both
Christian Scientists, tried to use Christian Science healing techniques to heal his diabetes.
In a constitutional world governed by our principle that the
state must stay out of the way of the struggle toward God, this
result is at least reason to pause. Although Lundman was evidently the first case to award damages for faith healing, prosecutions of parents whose children die under similar circumstances are reasonably common." Many of the cases involve Christian Scientists who do not accept the superiority of contemporary medicine to their faith-based care; and many others involve
Jehovah's Witnesses, who do not accept blood transfusions because of the biblical prohibition on ingesting blood.6" But official punishment is surely not the ideal response to the understandable and entirely justified effort to protect the life of the
sick child. Usually, the states try to prevent the death of the
63. 530 N.W.2d 807 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 828 (1996).
64. See, e.g., Walker v. Superior Court, 763 P.2d 852, 869-73 (Cal. 1988) (holding
that conviction of a Christian Scientist mother for failing to provide medical treatment for her child did not violate the mother's freedom of religion); Hermanson v.
State, 570 So. 2d 322, 337 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (affirming the conviction of
Christian Scientist parents who failed to provide -medical treatment for their child),
quashed by 604 So. 2d 775 (1995); Commonwealth v. Twitchell, 617 N.E.2d 609
(Mass. 1993) (reversing the involuntary manslaughter convictions of Christian Scientist parents who relied on spiritual treatment of their child's bowel condition).
65. See, e.g., In re McCauley, 565 N.E.2d 411, 414 (Mass. 1991) (affirming the
authorization of a child's blood transfusion, despite the protests of her Jehovah's
Witness parents); State v. Perricore, 181 A.2d 751, 759 (N.J. 1962) (requiring a
blood transfusion for the child of Jehovah's Witnesses, despite the religious objection
of the parents); e.G. v. Baum, 790 S.W.2d 839, 841 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (denying
relief to Jehovah's Witnesses whose child was appointed a temporary managing conservator with the authority to consent to blood transfusions for the child).
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child rather than punish it later. The typical case involves a
petition from a hospital for the temporary dissolution of the
parents' rights over the child and the appointment of a guardian
ad litem to make the decision on the surgery or transfusion.
After the decision is made and the procedure has been performed, the parents' rights are restored.
In other writing, I have defended this approach as a sensible
and probably inevitable compromise." Like others, I have insisted that the state's interest in preserving the life of the child is
sufficiently compelling to outweigh the very strong parental interest in controlling the religious upbringing of the child-a parental interest, as the Supreme Court has wisely noted, that is of
constitutional dimension." At the same time, I have cautioned
that the approach is anything but neutral: the courts that override the parents' religious objections may insist that they are
taking no position on the merits of the religious claim, but that
assertion cannot be correct. 68 To understand why, consider the
case of the Jehovah's Witnesses, many of whom believe that even
an unwilling violation of the rule against ingesting blood will lead
to the loss of salvation.69 When the state nevertheless insists
that the sick child must receive the transfusion, its action is anything but neutral, for if the parent is correct, the state is making
an insupportable decision, stealing the child's chance for eternal
life. Consequently, the only fair interpretation of the state's
choice is that it believes the parents' religious claim to be false.
In a world in which the guiding principle is neutrality, the
state is not permitted to reach a decision on such grounds,
which leaves us in a bit of a paradox. ° But in our more specu-

66. See CARTER, supra note 6, at 219-20.
67. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
68. See CARTER, supra note 6, at 220-21.
69. See id. at 219; supra note 65 and accompanying text; see also In re Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 557 N.Y.S.2d 239, 240 n.1 (Sup. Ct. 1990) (citing Genesis 9:34; Leviticus 3:17, 17:10-14; Deuteronomy 12:23; and Acts 15:29).
70. Some supporters of parental freedom to follow their religions and to choose
alternative medical care for their children point out that we allow parents to make
many choices that expose their children to very high risks: smoking while pregnant,
keeping loaded guns in the house, driving at break-neck speeds in horrendous
weather conditions, and, in a recent tragedy, trying to pilot a plane across the country while still too small to reach the pedals or see out the windscreen unaided. Only
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lative world, the world in which the guiding principle is that
religious freedom exists because God does, the paradox may vanish-and for the same reason that it disappears in the race discrimination cases. In every case involving efforts to force blood
transfusions or surgery for minor children, the courts have ruled
in favor of the hospital and against the religious objections of
the parents.7 ' In many of these cases, the courts have found
that the state's interest in the life of the child is compelling.7'
This would seem to interfere with the parental judgment, and
yet there is no clamor to have these cases overturned. Even the
proposed Parental Rights and Responsibility Act,73 which would
require that the state show a compelling interest whenever it
tries to interfere with the parents' judgment about the religious
upbringing of children, excludes from its general rule for parental decisions that would affect the children's health.74 Why the
evident lack of concern?
The answer, I would suggest, is surely that a majority of
Americans simply does not believe the heart of the parents'
religious claim: in particular, most Americans do not believe
that God will deny the child eternal salvation if the child hap-

when the parents make their choice for religious reasons, the argument runs, do we
suddenly see the need for legal intervention. But this clever argument ultimately is
unconvincing, because the basic analogy does not work. None of the examples include the elements of immediacy and relative medical certainty involved in the surgery and blood transfusion cases: we generally know that the child is sick now, not
that the child is at risk for a future illness, and we know that doctors believe there
to be a significant chance of cure with appropriate treatment. The analogies work
quite well, however, for children who are gravely ill with conditions that doctors believe they can treat but doubt they can cure, for the element of medical certainty is
no longer present.
71. Cf CARTER, supra note 6, at 219-20.
72.
The child is the citizen of the State. While he 'belongs' to his parents, he
belongs also to his State. Their rights in him entail many duties. Likewise the fact the child belongs to the State imposes upon the State many
duties. Chief among them is the duty to protect his right to live and to
grow up with a sound mind in a sound body, and to brook no interference with that right by any person or organization.
In re Sampson, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641, 652 (Fam. Ct. 1970) (quoting In re Clark, 185 N.E.2d
128, 132 (C.P. Lucas County 1962)); see supranote 65 and accompanying text.
73. S. 984, 104th Cong. (1995); H.R. 1946, 104th Cong. (1995).
74. S. 984 § 3(4)(B); H.R. 1946 § 3(4)(B).
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pens to receive a blood transfusion. True, four out of five
Americans believe that prayer can heal diseases, and, in general, Americans assert strong positions in favor of the right of
parents to control (I also like the Court's word, "direct"75) the
religious upbringing of their children. But the public draws the
line when a child's (temporal) life is in danger. Yet the ready
acceptance of the judicial determination that the life of the child
is too precious to risk for the sake of the parents' religious freedom need not be viewed as paradoxical; it may rest instead on a
broadly shared theological understanding, a bit of truth gleaned
from the struggle toward God.
The reader will recall that we saw the same process at work in
the race cases. What this suggests is that, even if religious freedom exists because God exists (principle 1) and if we ultimately
conclude that the state is disabled from taking sides in the struggle toward God (principles 3 and 4), there is a single reservation:
when the public concludes, by strong and clear consensus, that
God's Will on an issue is fully understood, it will allow interference with religious freedom, breaching the wall that would otherwise be virtually impregnable. If this speculation is correct, then
we can say that the public, believing overwhelmingly in a knowable Creator-God, has concluded that it knows at least two aspects of the Creator-God's will: racial discrimination is an absolute wrong, and the lives of small children are absolutely precious. For the sake of those absolutes, we will thus countenance
state intervention that we would otherwise condemn.
VI.
Now we begin to understand why there is no public clamor to
overturn such cases as Lyng. The problem is not simply that the
religions affected are minority religions about which few people
care; the problem is that the religions affected are unusual religions in which few people believe. This could explain why the
remarkable coalition of religious groups that was able to bring
about passage of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act in

75. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925).
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1993"8 has shown virtually no interest in the Native American
77
Cultural Protection and Free Exercise of Religion Act, which
would explicitly protect a variety of Native American religious
traditions that are threatened by the indifference, not the hostility, of regulators.
To its credit, the Supreme Court has made clear that it will
not countenance official hostility, even toward religions that are
unfamiliar or widely disbelieved. So, for example, in Church of
the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,8 the Justices
unanimously struck down a city animal rights ordinance that
made exceptions, either as written or as applied, for virtually all
killing of animals except the killing done by adherents of the
Santerfa religious tradition. This conclusion is obviously correct
under either the neutrality principle or the vision I have been
discussing here. More important-although there are no polling
data of which I am aware-I suspect that the distinction it
draws is one that most Americans could readily accept. The
state may not single out a religious group for special persecution, even in the name of protecting animal rights, but this says
nothing about the enforceability of animal rights ordinances that
affect Santerfa by inadvertence rather than design. Indeed,
although I think the question a difficult one, the courts generally have sustained the operation of such ordinances against religious freedom challenges, and most members of the public probably would find this acceptable.
But finding a regulation acceptable is a very far cry from
believing that the regulation is expressive of Divine Will. So
even if, as I have suggested, a majority of Americans would
agree that God wills racial equality, and are prepared to be a
little bit fanatical on the point, I would be surprised if a majority agreed with the proposition that God wills that animals not
be sacrificed-not least because the Bible is full of counter-examples. 9 Now let us suppose that a court, following the letter
of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, demands a compelling
76.
77.
78.
79.
6:14;

42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994).
S. 2269, 103d Cong. (1994).
508 U.S. 520 (1993).
See, e.g., Genesis 22:13, 31:54; Leviticus 1:2-17, 2:1-16, 4:3, 24-26; Numbers
Joshua 8:31; Isaiah 43:23; Jeremiah 17:26 (King James).
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interest before it will allow application of a perfectly neutral
animal rights ordinance against Santerfa. Animal sacrifice, after
all, is central to the Santerfa theology, which teaches that the
blood of animals is needed to nourish the orishas, the personal
gods that influence human destiny. 0 Suppose further that the
court were to decide (as I believe it should) that no compelling
interest existed, and that therefore the santeros were free to
sacrifice animals as part of their worship. The public might be
irritated, but I would be surprised were there a strong general
clamor (as opposed to a clamor among animal rights activists)
for overturning the decision. Why? Because the animal sacrifice
question would lack the religious fervor that usually accompanies demands for state action that treats religious beliefs as
effectively wrong.
Thus it is possible (within the framework of our speculation)
to advance the following hypothesis: the public will go along
with state action limiting the religious freedom of groups that it
happens to think wrong but will militate for action only against
groups that it thinks are actively pursuing the opposite of what
God wants. So, on such cases as Lyng and Lukumi Babalu Aye,
a majority of Americans is prepared, although perhaps with
some groaning, to countenance any result. But on a case like
Bob Jones, the public will accept only one answer: the answer
that God wills. This may not be good constitutional law, and a
nation like ours, dedicated to religious pluralism, should shudder at the notion that we choose which religions to repress according to what God commands. Even True Believer might
pause, if only for the transitional reason discussed at the outset,
that his religion could be the next to go.
But I am here describing what I think might be rather than
what I think should be. And if the description is unsettling, that
suggests that Stanley Fish's challenge turns out to be harder to
meet than I proposed. It may be that no matter how hard True
Believer tries to follow his rational conclusion that principle 4 is
correct, that the state furthers religious freedom only by staying
out of the way, he will finally yield anyway to the splendid
temptation to coerce others to do the right, to remake the secu80. See Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 525.
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lar world in accordance with the Truth, and, if necessary, to use
force to get there. Perhaps he will be influenced by the famous
epigram of Moses Maimonides- Everything that you do, do for
the sake of God" 8-and will thus decide, like so many True
Believers before him, that "everything" includes the coercion of
Nonbelievers, if not in matters of doctrine, at least in matters of
morality.
I would be the last person to argue that religion has no place
in politics: religious freedom is not freedom if it stops when True
Believers open their mouths in the public square, and America
would not be America had True Believers ever behaved that way.
Fortunately, they have not. The most obvious example is that we
would have been denied the openly religious activism of the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., leader of the Southern Christian
Leadership Conference. It has become a commonplace in our
revisionist times to insist that Dr. King's public ministry was
actually something else: for example, a secular political crusade
dressed up with the trappings of religion. This description strikes
me as historically inaccurate, as well as insulting to the many
religious and nonreligious people who were so moved by Dr.
King's appeals to the Word of God that they took up the cross
and followed him, often at significant personal cost. Dr. King's
public work was the same as his private work: preaching the
Word of God and making his public life a witness to God's Will,
in the hope and the faith that others would be inspired to follow.
It is useful here, however, to remind ourselves of human frailty. Dr. King was not perfect; he was a man, he had flaws; but
that is the point of the story, and, in a sense, the power of his
example. Since Aristotle, the Western tradition has accepted
that God is perfect. But man has always been considered at best
perfectible-and, for Christians, not even that. Human beings
are mortal; in the Christian vision, human beings are fallen. The
significance of this point is that we cannot reasonably expect
anybody to live the life of perfect obedience to God, because to do
so would be inhuman. What we can reasonably expect is a life of
striving, falling, and striving again. This understanding frees

81. ABRAHAi JOSHUA HESCHEL, MAIMONIDES 203 (Joachim Neugroschel trans.,
Doubleday 1991) (1982) (originally published in German in 1935).
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human beings of what would otherwise be the unbearable guilt
of knowing how our own imperfection falls short of God's perfection.82 For democratic citizens, it frees us from what otherwise
would be the unbearable contradiction of fearing to preach God's
word to others because of an inability to live it perfectly ourselves. What True Believers believe, they should be willing to
proclaim.
At the same time, I continue to fear that too many True Believers fail to heed the lessons that Kierkegaard correctly drew
from the descent of Christianity into Christendom: the threat
that emerges from too much religious activism in politics is not a
threat to democracy or to politics, but a threat to religion itself.
Roger Williams was right: the wall of separation is needed to
protect the garden, not the wilderness. Some of today's loudest
critics of the way in which the judiciary has sadly misused that
wall would do well to ponder the power of Williams's insight.
VII.
All of this, let me remind the reader, is in the nature of a
speculation, a preliminary investigation of how religious freedom might look were we to begin with a believing rather than a
skeptical premise. Naturally, I understand that constitutional
law as it stands is much to the contrary: skepticism, even when
it manifests itself as disbelief or hostility, is said to be the required government stance. I do not argue that a believing
stance would be a better one, or that we would be better off as
a theocracy; as I hope my commitment to principles 3 and 4
makes clear, I would rather keep government out of religious
life. It is also not my purpose here to offer a full-blown theory
of religious freedom under the Constitution. Nevertheless, for
me as a Christian, it is important to be able to answer the challenge that Fish and others have raised, to decide whether True
Believers can believe in the liberal state. That, of course, is a
large project, too large for this paper. For the moment, it is
sufficient to address the question of whether the religiously

82. See KARL RAHNER, FOUNDATIONS OF CHRISTIAN FAITH 90-115 (William V. Dych

trans., Seabury Press 1978) (1976).
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devout (and religiously confident) also can be zealous and sincere advocates of genuine and permanent religious freedom.
And although I have obviously left some major theoretical and
political battlegrounds for later exploration-for example, the
content of the curriculum of the public school day-my preliminary answer to the question is a resounding Yes.

